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TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL FIELD THEORY OF
NATIONAL PRIVATE RIGHTS AND FEDERALISM
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.*
I want to thank the Montana Law Review and the students at Univer-
sity of Montana Law School for asking me to participate in this wonderful
conference. They couldn’t provide for the extraordinary scenery and
weather, but they could provide for extraordinary panels. And one of the
things that I really love about this conference is that on every panel the law
review has mixed up law professors with judges, prosecutors, and really
experienced people. It was a nice combination. So thanks a lot for having
me. I have had a great time.
I won’t try to keep up the high standards, but I will try to make my
PowerPoints colorful. I will try to say something very general, and my am-
bition is to say it quickly. My watch says it’s 4:47, and I hope that I can do
this in 35 or 40 minutes.
The general idea—which doesn’t sound like a 35 or 40-minute thing—
is called “Towards a Universal Field Theory of National Private Rights and
Federalism.” It does not sound like a short topic. But the idea is to talk a
little bit about the relationship between federalism and national private
rights—that is to say fundamental rights—that the national government
protects.
What I want to talk about is what I think is a misunderstood relation-
ship between national rights that protect private organizations and private
entities; and subnational governments’ powers, which I will call federalism.
I think there is a misunderstood relationship between national private rights
and federalism. They are considered to be not only different, but opposed to
each other.
Private rights and federalism are not just different things, but aimed at
different ends. Private rights are enforced by courts to protect private indi-
viduals, whereas subnational governments’ powers are exercised by legisla-
tures to protect communities by burdening individuals. So the idea is that
we oppose these things to each other. There is federalism on one side (and
that’s for communities—which are important) and they burden individual
rights; and there are national individual rights (or national private rights—
there’s an important distinction) on the other side, and they come in to
prevent those burdens and protect individuals.
* Roderick M. Hills, Jr. is the William T. Comfort, III Professor of Law at New York University
School of Law.
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I want to think of a picture. You’ve got your subnational government,
for instance, the New York State House. The state legislature confers pow-
ers on a community. The community clobbers the individual with an anvil.
Maybe that’s a good thing. Maybe the anvil (which the community drops on
the individual) is outweighed by the benefit to the community. You get it?
Outweighed? That’s the image we have in our head.
Where do national rights come in? Well, there’s the Bill of Rights: it
provides liberties, and the liberties stop the anvil. Right? The liberties inter-
vene to protect the individual from the community, and we balance whether
the interest to the individual is greater or less than the interest to the com-
munity. That’s the picture we have, and it’s mistaken in every single re-
spect.
The idea that we should look to national private rights to protect indi-
vidual liberties, and look to federalism not to protect these liberties, seems
to me to be mistaken. I want to talk about why I think that’s mistaken, and
where I think the mistake comes from. Now, the theory that I’m describ-
ing—where liberties of individuals are protected by national private rights,
and communal power and only communal power is protected by federal-
ism—comes from a historical moment and a historical text, both classics in
U.S. history.
The historical moment of course is this:
Figure 1: A. R. Waud, Drawing, “The Freedmen’s Bureau” (1868), Lib. of Cong., The Freedmen’s
Bureau, http://perma.cc/WPU2-CLTF (http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/92514996/) (accessed Mar. 9,
2015).
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol76/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON109.txt unknown Seq: 3 21-APR-15 11:45
2015 NATIONAL PRIVATE RIGHTS AND FEDERALISM 43
It is the Reconstruction. It is the Union Blue Army, and later federal
judges, interceding to protect the freedmen from white racist mobs. And
that sticks in our mind as the essence of what a national private right is all
about. It’s to intercede to stop that kind of disaster—that is the paradigm of
what national private rights are about.
And the classic text, of course, is Federalist No. 10.1 Madison says:
“Look, if you extend the sphere of a stronger national government, you’re
taking a greater variety of parties’ interests to make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens. They’ll be disunited. Even if they can get a common motive,
it’ll just be difficult for them to act. And because it’ll be difficult for a
majority to coalesce in a heterogeneous republic, the national government is
much more likely to protect minorities and individuals from majorities.”2
It’s such a classic image in constitutional law that it’s been absorbed by
everyone.
That text and that image constitute the foundation for what I think is a
mistaken view of the relationship of federalism and national public rights. I
want to say everything about this picture is wrong. In what follows, I will
argue in favor of the following positions that, taken together, propose what
I pretentiously call a “universal field theory of private rights and federal-
ism.” As I say, I want to unify these things together. There are only five
things I want to say. It’s now 4:52.
First, I want to make a basic realist point about what national private
rights often do. They often create powerful private organizations that don’t
help individuals but oppress them.
The second point I want to make, and I will use Hobby Lobby3 as an
example, is that federalism (or subnational government) does not simply
safeguard community power but often protects individuals from these na-
tional, private rights that endanger individuals. National private rights can
be oppressive.
The third thing I want to talk about is the forgotten Madison. Not the
Madison of Federalist No. 10, but the Madison of three years later, in es-
says4 that nobody ever reads anymore, but which were extremely important
to Madison and to his conception of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Es-
sentially, Madison had a theory of dysfunction not only of state govern-
1. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in Madison: Writings 1772–1836 at 160–168 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., Lib. of Am. 1999) (hereinafter Federalist No. 10).
2. See id. at 166.
3. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
4. James Madison, Public Opinion, in Madison: Writings 1772–1836, supra n. 1, at 500–501
(hereinafter Public Opinion); James Madison, Consolidation, in Madison: Writings 1772–1836, supra n.
1, at 498–500 (hereinafter Consolidation).
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ments—that’s Federalist No. 10: they’re too homogenous, they act in a
majoritarian way and encourage majority factionalism5—but also a theory
of the dysfunction of the national government. It’s just the mirror image.
The national government is dominated by minoritarian interests, by minori-
ties that will try to extract special rights or special protections—national
private rights—and use them against individuals.6
The fourth point that I want to make is that the Rehnquist Court’s
efforts to limit federal power with this funny category of non-economic
affairs is an effort to revive in some ways Madison’s second period, the
forgotten period. And it deserves a little more respect than it sometimes
gets. Because essentially, federalism doctrine is trying to take into account
the minoritarian worry and measure that against the majoritarian fear of
Federalist No. 10.
And finally I want to talk about a case study which will involve Title
IX. If I can’t talk about it because my time is up then, you know, we can
talk about it in Q and A. So that’s my basic mission.
Let me start with a basic question. How do private rights create private
governments that can sometimes be dangerous or oppressive? Here’s a sim-
ple picture. We have public governments—there are fifty states, but also,
overlaying those public governments are private governments. And the pri-
vate governments are creatures of property, contract, and tort. The fact that
they are creatures of private law doesn’t make them less formidable. It’s a
stale, but reliable, realist truth that the powers enjoyed under common law
are not functionally different than sovereign powers, because they allow
these organizations to have serious effects on their employees, their congre-
gations, their consumers, their shareholders, their listeners.
So, if you have a sort of Robert Hale or Lewis Jaffe realist view of the
world,7 these are also governments. The Mormon Church is a powerful
government. And if, for instance, we want to say that the Mormon Church
as a private government is weaker than public governments, because after
all, all these private governments are constrained by foot voting, as Ilya
Somin would say,8 the response might be, well, public governments are
5. Federalist No. 10, supra n. 1, at 165–166. R
6. Public Opinion, supra n. 4, at 501 (“The larger a country, the less easy for its real opinion to be
ascertained, and the less difficult to be counterfeited; when ascertained or presumed, the more respecta-
ble it is in the eyes of individuals.”).
7. See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 Political Sci. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum.
L. Rev. 603 (1943); Robert L. Hale, Freedom through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power
(Colum. U. Press 1952); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Little, Brown & Co.
1965).
8. See Ilya Somin, Democracy, Foot Voting, and the Case for Limiting Federal Power, 76 Mont.
L. Rev. 21 (2015).
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constrained by foot voting too, and I dare say it is much easier to move
from Missoula to Lolo than it is to leave the church of your fathers. And so
if you ask me who has more power, constrained by foot voting, I have no
doubt that the Mormon Church is much more powerful than Missoula. Peo-
ple leave Missoula every day, and they do it just because they might be
miffed or because they like Butte better.
I could foot vote my way out of, say, I don’t know, NYU Law School,
but I can only do it if I can get University of Montana Law School to hire
me; and given that there’s a lot of collusion among law schools it might be
difficult for me to drive certain kinds of bargains. There is foot voting
among law schools—a lot of it—but there’s also cartelization among law
schools. Again, these private organizations have serious power. I call them
“private governments.” And we can go on: private corporations, some with
religious points of view, some without; nonprofit organizations; and trade
unions.
And all of these governments are not only competing with fifty states
but three thousand counties, twenty-five thousand general purpose govern-
ments and about eighteen thousand school districts and a lot of special dis-
tricts too numerous to mention. And so I want you to think about the federal
system as actually two federal systems: a public one and a private one, and
they compete with each other. What private rights do is empower the pri-
vate federal system—that’s what they do, and it could be a good thing or a
bad thing.
What I want to talk about next—the second of my five points—is how
subnational governments sometimes promote individual liberty and equality
by limiting national rights. How could I illustrate that? Well, I want to talk
about the case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby involved the
Court’s holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, RFRA9—
which was an effort by Congress to protect private rights, so it’s a national
private right—limited the scope of the employer mandate under the Afford-
able Care Act.10 The Court held that RFRA barred Congress from requiring
private corporations to pay for employees’ health insurance covering medi-
cal services that were regarded as religiously objectionable by the corpora-
tion’s shareholders.11 So this is a case where a private national right limits
the ACA’s employer mandate.
Now, I think that there is a non-trivial argument that this national pro-
tection of private rights actually diminishes the total sum of true individual
liberty. Is it a correct argument? No, it’s rested on the intuition of female
employees who now lost equal access to an important benefit. They lost
9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
10. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2785.
11. Id. at 2783–2785.
5
Hills: Towards a Universal Field Theory of National Private Rights and Federalism
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2015
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON109.txt unknown Seq: 6 21-APR-15 11:45
46 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 76
some liberty and some equality. Now of course the question is controver-
sial. One could argue that the system of private government protected by
Hobby Lobby does a good job of protecting employees’ access because em-
ployees can vote with their feet to go work for another employer. There is
competition in foot voting that constrains Hobby Lobby. The number of
corporations that will actually avail themselves of Hobby Lobby is trivially
small, given that the collective action problems faced by religious share-
holders who want to take over corporations and invest them with a religious
purpose are pretty high.
Both shareholder law (or corporate law)—the law of voice—and the
employment market—the law of exit—constrain Hobby Lobby in important
ways. We shouldn’t assume that Hobby Lobby and RFRA—this national
protection of private rights—oppress individual liberty. But we should be
prepared to argue it: it’s plausible. Because there are a significant number
of people, I dare say, in this room, who believe that labor markets are not
perfect, and that labor markets give advantages to large employers (espe-
cially in a slack labor market), and some people might also think that the
limits on shareholders are not ideal. So there’s a question about whether
private organizations are adequately constrained by the rights that define
their powers.
Now, let’s look at the system of federalism, which is opposite this
national private right. Out of the Court’s doctrine of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Section V powers announced in City of Boerne v. Flores,12 Congress
is prohibited from enforcing RFRA against state laws,13 which means of
course that state governments can decide to impose exactly the mandate that
was struck down in Hobby Lobby against any employer within their terri-
tory. And so if you are interested in protecting the individual liberty of
female employees to get contraception at the employer’s expense, if you
thought that was an important liberty, federalism is the one that’s protecting
it, not national private rights. National private rights are endangering it.
And so that’s an immediately intuitive counterexample, a politically correct
one, that I’m giving you to illustrate why I think sometimes national private
rights are a danger to individual liberty and not a protection.
Hobby Lobby and Boerne are not the only examples of state attacks on
nationally guaranteed private rights that actually promote liberty. During
the 1840s and 1850s, northern states enacted various anti-kidnapping laws,
designed to frustrate slave-catchers’ efforts to recover fugitive slaves.14 The
12. 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5.
13. Id. at 519–520.
14. E.g. Laws of the State of New York of a General Nature ch. 375, §§ 1–4, 395–396 (Thomas H.
Hyatt 1841).
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important thing to understand is those slave catchers were enforcing a textu-
ally specific, national private right under Article IV, section II, clause 3, the
Fugitive Slave Clause.15 And the U.S. Supreme Court, the champion of
rights, gave those private rights broad reading in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,16
an opinion written by Justice Story, the hero and champion of the Marshall
Court’s idea that vested private rights should trump state power.
And so I guess if you believe that national private rights stand for
individual liberty, and federalism stands for communities limiting individ-
ual liberty, then this picture makes sense to you. The Massachusetts citizens
that enact these protections of fugitive slaves are a majoritarian faction lim-
iting fundamental national rights; and Joseph Story, who wrote Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, is a judicial protector of fundamental national rights. And
that’s true as far as it goes. Story is protecting national private rights: con-
stitutional rights, specific rights, rights that absolutely are guaranteed by the
Constitution. Here’s a flyer that was handed out by Massachusetts advo-
cates of liberty:
Figure 2. History.com, Fugitive Slave Acts, http://perma.cc/8HTE-Q664 (http://www.history.com/topics/
black-history/fugitive-slave-acts) (accessed Mar. 9, 2015).
15. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be dis-
charged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service or Labour may be due.”).
16. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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The Massachusetts citizens were urging fugitive slaves not simply to
hide but to avail themselves of state law. They were certainly acting as a
mob—limiting, lawlessly, perhaps, national private rights. I say they were
advancing individual liberty.
And so, do not think that federalism is a limit on individual liberty and
national law is the defining source of individual liberty. It is naive to be-
lieve that national protection of individual rights is identical to the safe-
guarding of individual freedom.
Now, third point. What was Madison’s theory that would make this
more than just an occasional mistake? I mean, we all make mistakes. Just
because Justice Story and the framers of the U.S. Constitution made per-
haps excessive concessions to slave owners to get them to join the Union,
does not mean that the national government is systematically likely to en-
force national private rights that are oppressive, right? Well, Madison had a
theory that nicely complements Federalist No. 10. It was a theory that he
announced in pamphlets in the National Gazette17 shortly after the Consti-
tution was ratified and the First Bank of the United States was proposed.
And that theory, just to set the historical record straight, was essen-
tially a theory that said the national government is uniquely prone to mi-
noritarian capture. Madison argued a continental-scale democracy, the kind
of democracy that he said prevented a majoritarian faction in Federalist No.
10, made it extremely difficult for members of Congress to know what their
constituents really wanted. Here are his words: “The larger a country, the
less easy for its real opinion to be ascertained, and the less difficult to be
counterfeited.”18 And those lines, I think, are the critical ones from Public
Opinion: “[T]he more insignificant [also in a larger country] is each indi-
vidual in his own eyes.”19 So individuals just don’t mobilize effectively in a
continental-scale democracy, he says. But that’s not inconsistent with Fed-
eralist No. 10, that’s exactly what he said in Federalist No. 10, except in
Federalist No. 10 he said: “High five! That’s awesome!”20 In Public Opin-
ion he said: “This is a disaster. This is a problem.”21 Why did he change his
mind without changing the political theory?
Now, Public Opinion was also associated with Consolidation, another
essay, and here’s where he says: “[T]he same space of country that would
produce an undue growth of the executive power, would prevent that con-
trol on the Legislative body, which is essential to a faithful discharge of its
17. Public Opinion, supra n. 4; Consolidation, supra n. 4. R
18. Public Opinion, supra n. 4, at 501. R
19. Id.
20. See Federalist No. 10, supra n. 1, at 163. R
21. See Public Opinion, supra n. 4, at 501 (“This may be unfavorable to liberty.”). R
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol76/iss1/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON109.txt unknown Seq: 9 21-APR-15 11:45
2015 NATIONAL PRIVATE RIGHTS AND FEDERALISM 49
trust.”22 He wants to say the following, which is a Federalist No. 10 senti-
ment, but with a negative sign rather than a positive sign next to it:
“[N]either the voice nor the sense of ten or twenty millions of people,
spread through so many latitudes as are comprehended within the United
States, could ever be combined or called into effect.”23 He wants to say that
mobilization—popular mobilization—in the United States at the national
level is extremely difficult. And that could be a problem if the national
government ignores the local ordinance, and by local ordinance I mean
states’ governance. And the main problem he saw was actually the undue
growth of the executive power—of course the Federalist Party, this time of
Washington, later of John Adams. Madison’s idea is that the reason why the
Federalists have power is because we can’t mobilize against them because
we face mobilization problems and collective action costs.
Madison’s idea in Consolidation and in Public Opinion, which were
called the National Gazette essays, has a paradigm just as our Fourteenth
Amendment and Federalist No. 10 have paradigms. For the Fourteenth
Amendment, it’s Reconstruction; for Madison, it’s the First Bank of the
United States. That’s the First Bank of the United States down there, I actu-
ally took a little photograph of it, when I was on Chestnut Street, and here’s
the speech he made against it. This is a speech that Ilya Somin mentions.24
Madison says, “Look, the powers that were conferred upon the bank in
1791 were powers that created national private rights—vested rights, de-
signed to protect shareholders—but they were powers that created monop-
oly; they deprived Congress of the ability to supervise this monster, tied up
the hands of elected officials, and so, deprived citizens of equal rights.
These aren’t private rights, they’re national private rights and they’re bad.”
This is from his speech on the floor that he made in 1791.25 He gets to the
Bank of the United States that Ilya Somin mentioned earlier, and in that
speech, Madison offers a canon of construction of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. He says, “Here is my way of protecting us against these national
private rights that are created by shareholders in Philadelphia who—taking
advantage of the fact that the majorities can’t mobilize against them—cap-
22. Consolidation, supra n. 4, at 498. R
23. Id. at 498–499.
24. Ilya Somin, The Impact of Judicial Review on American Federalism: Promoting Centralization
More Than State Autonomy, in Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists or Unitarists? (Nicholas
Aroney & John Kincaid eds., Oxford U. Press, forthcoming) (ms. at 10–11, available at Geo. Mason U.
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-45, 2013, http://perma.cc/8X4D-M4ME (http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311400)).
25. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, in Madison: Writings
1772–1836, supra n. 1, at 487–488 (hereinafter Opposing the National Bank) (“It takes from our succes-
sors . . . an opportunity of exercising that right, for an immoderate term. . . . It involves a monopoly,
which affects the equal rights of every citizen.”).
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ture Congress and extract benefits that they couldn’t have extracted at a
more accountable level of government.”26
Here’s the canon. He says: “In admitting or rejecting a constructive
authority”—that means, an interpretation of a vague constitutional phrase—
“not only the degree of its incidentality to an express authority, is to be
regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend the
probability or improbability of its being left to construction.”27 What the
heck does Madison mean by that? He’s saying, look, the powers being con-
ferred on the First Bank of the United States are really important—they’re
big, they’re dangerous, they’re scary, they cannot be left to implication.28
Normally, we would defer to Congress about whether a power is suffi-
ciently close to an express power to be justified, but these kinds of powers
fall into a different category. I say it is a suspect classification. And there-
fore the powers need to be scrutinized more carefully. Now, Madison’s sus-
pect classification was not action versus inaction, which I am on record as
thinking a silly suspect classification. Randy Barnett’s an old friend of
mine, I like him very much, but I don’t see the point of this suspect classifi-
cation in Sebelius.29 Madison had a different one; his suspect classification
is: do not delegate powers to private corporations, especially financial cor-
porations, especially powers that are monopolistic in nature or give them
exclusive rights for long periods of time. If you do that, then all deference is
off; we are going to watch you through a microscope. And that was his
argument for why the First Bank of the United States was unconstitutional.
Now, I want to emphasize this canon of construction can be phrased
more generally in the following way. Basically, he’s saying the national
government is prone to capture by minority factions. When the national
government confers “important” powers—his word—on private groups in
ways that do not reflect majority consensus, there’s a danger of oppression.
So you need to look very carefully at whether those private organizations,
created by these national private rights, are constrained by exit and by
voice. Is the First Bank of the United States constrained by voice? No—the
President only appoints twenty percent of its directors, and they meet in
secret. Is it constrained by exit? No—because the law that created it banned
any other private banks from competing with it. It had an exclusive
franchise for twenty years. And so, Madison reasons, you’ve created an
entity that is unconstrained. And therefore we are going to scrutinize it very
carefully. That’s his suspect classification. I find it so much more persua-
26. See id. at 484, 487.
27. Id. at 482.
28. See id. at 481.
29. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate
Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 581, 604–605 (2010).
10
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sive than the Sebelius suspect classification, but that’s an offhand editorial
that’s neither here nor there.
The important point is that Ilya Somin is absolutely right: the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause is not just one clause.30 Sometimes it’s applied with
extraordinary deference, because you don’t trigger one of these suspect
classifications with a national law; sometimes the deference should be sus-
pended because you’ve passed a national law that triggers the very danger
to which national governments are prone—minoritarian tyranny—and there
are symptoms of such laws. The First Bank of the United States epitomizes
such symptoms.
Okay, fourth point. I think I’m going to make my time. Modern juris-
prudence has generally focused almost obsessively and solely on the idea of
Federalist No. 10, that idea that subnational governments are prone to
majoritarian factionalism, especially on issues that divide citizens on cul-
tural or religious lines—which is also an inheritance from Madison, who is
a defender of religious liberty—and fear of religious majoritarianism. By
strictly scrutinizing state laws that impose burdens for reasons of cultural or
religious bias, therefore, the U.S. Constitution can avert the acrimony and
non-deliberative oppression that such majoritarian factionalism breeds.
And so you can see immediately from Federalist No. 10 springs the
theory of suspect classifications with state laws. What is the category of the
state laws? Well, you know, because in first-year Con Law you start with
Griswold v. Connecticut,31 then you go to Eisenstadt v. Baird,32 you move
your way up to Roe v. Wade,33 and the category in all the casebooks—from
Kathleen Sullivan34 to Akhil Amar35 and Cass Sunstein36—is non-eco-
nomic. If the state law deals with non-economic affairs, then it’s suddenly
suspect.
Now, why is that? Is it because non-economic matters—which they
typically define to concern marriage, childbirth, sex, sexual morality, and
maybe the raising of children in Moore v. City of East Cleveland37—are
subject to so much more suspicion than, say, state wage regulation or state
30. See Br. of the Wash. Leg. Found. & Const. L. Scholars in Support of Respts. (Individual Man-
date Issue), U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 2012 WL 1680857 at **7–8 (U.S. 2012)
(No. 11-398) (where Somin was Counsel of Record).
31. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law, at xiv, xv, 501 (18th ed., LEG, Inc.
2013).
35. Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials, at xxv (5th
ed., Aspen Publishers 2006).
36. Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law, at xxiii, 852 (7th ed., Wolters Kluwer L. & Bus.
2013).
37. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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hours regulation? We are cartelizing state rules on economic matters. After
all, the power to earn a wage or to run a firm can be much more important
to someone than the power to get laid. John Hart Ely famously said this,38
and David Bernstein39 my classmate, and Ilya Somin40 says this.
I don’t think it’s because of the importance of the rights. It’s the risk of
an improper motive. The theory is that when states regulate in these areas,
we should be very suspicious that the majoritarian passions are triggered,
because we know that in America sex, drugs, and morality brings out the
most passionate and zealous in us. And therefore we worry that the signa-
ture fault of subnational governments, brought about by homogeneity and
unity—namely, majoritarian factionalism—is being triggered. We don’t
have that worry when some special interest group creates a license for opti-
cians or for beauticians. That’s bad, but that’s not the signature fault of state
governments. Madison thought that was the signature fault of the national
government. State governments are majoritarian. They’ll work those kinds
of problems out for themselves. They’ll get rid of those archaic licensing
requirements. So we can leave that to the political process, but where we
can’t trust state governments is where they’re regulating the Freedmen, or
the Catholics, or the gays. And that’s why the non-economic category, I
would argue, is especially supervised. When you’re dealing with democ-
racy, disagreement, decentralization, and substantive due process, you end
up with a state that is dominated by one faction. For instance, Texas, and
boy is it red. It enacts laws that seem to tread in an area where majoritarian
factionalism is at high risk.
How do we solve this problem? Simple: we decentralize. Now, we
don’t decentralize the public governments; we decentralize the private enti-
ties. Because the whole theory of Griswold and Roe is that they create a
system of private government: women and their doctors; husbands and their
wives; couples. They are capable of governing these things. And because
they represent both the minority and the majority, if we have a constitu-
tional doctrine that delegates to these private governments the questions
that are the subject of the hot culture war at issue, we can have blue families
and red families. Catholics can avoid contraception. Seculars can use con-
traception. Think of it as a federal system. A federal system that avoids the
signature vice of majoritarian governments. That is I think the political the-
38. John Hart Ely, On Constitutional Ground 290–303 (Princeton U. Press 1996).
39. See generally David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against
Progressive Reform (U. of Chi. Press 2011).
40. See generally Ilya Somin, The Volokh Conspiracy, Gonzales v. Raich and the Individual Man-
date, http://perma.cc/9L82-BXQL (http://volokh.com/2010/10/05/gonzales-v-raich-and-the-individual-
mandate/) (Oct. 5, 2010, 1:10 a.m. ET); Ilya Somin, Jurist.org, Why the Individual Health Care Mandate
is Unconstitutional, http://perma.cc/V8AU-UFWL (http://jurist.org/forum/2011/05/ilya-somin-mandate-
is-unconstitutional.php) (May 4, 2011, 8:00 a.m. ET).
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ory behind Griswold, which is the political theory behind Federalist No. 10.
Decentralization can cure majority factionalism.
Okay, what I love about United States v. Lopez,41 and it’s the next
point to which I want to turn, is that Lopez uses the exact same category of
the non-economic.42 Everybody ridicules this category. Neil Siegel says it’s
functionally useless, it has no point.43 Why would you say that non-eco-
nomic matters should be distinctly outside of Congress’s control? That’s
not really related to any functional theory of federalism.44 And I say Neil,
you’re wrong. Because in the category of non-economic here, Rehnquist is
quite self-consciously drawing upon Griswold and upon Roe. The non-eco-
nomic in Lopez is “family law (including marriage, divorce, and child cus-
tody).”45 Aren’t those the subjects of associational privacy under substan-
tive due process in Griswold?46 Yes indeed they are.47 So Rehnquist is just
taking exactly the same category; but if you think this is functionally use-
less in federalism, you must think it’s functionally useless in Griswold. But
I say it serves exactly the same function in both areas of doctrine. This is
why I called this a unified field theory of federalism and individual rights.
This is what you see also, by the way, in United States v. Morrison.48 Rehn-
quist repeats it again. What is non-economic? It’s family law: marriage,
divorce, and childrearing.49 He’s serious about that.
So what functional point does the non-economic serve in federalism?
Well, here’s my pitch. Now, I’m putting words into Rehnquist’s mouth, but
he wasn’t a man known for filling his opinions with elaborate reasoning,
and I say that with no disrespect to the late Chief Justice. I suggest that the
Rehnquist Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine in Lopez and Morrison—
subjecting to strict scrutiny federal statutes dealing with non-economic af-
fairs, really defined to mean substantive due process-y culture wars af-
fairs—is based upon that neglected Madisonian worry about national mi-
noritarian faction.
Here’s how it works. We the people are often deeply divided about
matters of fundamental cultural importance. We’re divided by sex, the edu-
cation of children, marriage, abortion—religious matters, really. These are
issues of intrinsic rather than instrumental importance—good and evil—for
41. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
42. Id. at 567.
43. Neil S. Siegel, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: Customary Allo-
cation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 Duke L.J. 797, 818–820 (2012).
44. Id. at 822–823.
45. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Id. at 485–486.
48. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
49. Id. at 615–616.
13
Hills: Towards a Universal Field Theory of National Private Rights and Federalism
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2015
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON109.txt unknown Seq: 14 21-APR-15 11:45
54 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 76
which compromise and negotiation are psychologically painful, and the risk
of dogmatic insistence on your point of view is unusually high. And if you
live in that world, of hot red and bright blue divisions, a rational Congress
would leave such matters to state governments. Because they would realize
they cannot possibly resolve these kinds of issues at the national level.
Again, Ilya Somin said this quite nicely, that nationalizing these issues is
highly polarizing, it leads to pointless fights that will never end.50
So you would think this is precisely the area where federalism should
govern. However, Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the federal judici-
ary, may be prone, as Madison says, to minority capture. Tight-knit zealous
groups—in the old days they’d be the Puritans or the Evangelicals, nowa-
days they might be just zealots who have an agenda—push their culture war
agendas through the national lawmaking process and the bureaucratic and
administrative process on culturally-sensitive issues. So we get unnecessary
nationalization of the culture wars. What I think Rehnquist is trying to do is
suppress that. He’s a very practical guy, and he says we need to have a
special doctrine that says when the national government intrudes into this
area, the courts will step in and do something to push the government out of
it.51 Because we think something’s wrong—they’re not acting like a ra-
tional federal regime. By preserving exclusive state jurisdiction over such
topics, the national government can save the national government from it-
self. Avoiding either gridlock—in case the government gets tied up with
same-sex marriage—or resentful acrimony, in case they actually pass a law
on same-sex marriage. Right? And really piss off one-half of the country.
So, I think that’s the function of Lopez: to cure what Rehnquist takes
to be a minoritarian faction of cultural zealots launching, essentially, an
anti-federalism coup.
Okay, so we have two theories here. If you have that first theory,
you’ll have an image of a nation that’s actually closely divided between red
and blue. And why would they pass gridlocked or acrimony-inducing cul-
ture wars laws? Not because of the majoritarian reasons but because of
minoritarian reasons. Here’s Rehnquist’s antidote: not red and blue fami-
lies, but red and blue states. That’ll pacify the conflict.52 Now I’m not say-
ing he’s right on this but it’s exactly the same antidote that Madison pro-
posed for the National Bank of the United States. Strictly scrutinize laws
where you think that there’s a high chance of a minority coup.
Okay, my clock says it’s 5:17, which means I should shut up soon.
Fortunately I’m on my last point.
50. See generally Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is
Smarter (Stanford U. Press 2013).
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–568; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.
52. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–568; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–618.
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We have a problem here. We have two Madisonian theories. We have
the well-known Madison in Federalist No. 10: “State governments are
prone to majority factionalism.” We also have Madisonian theory that no-
body ever hears about which is that national government is prone to mi-
noritarian factionalism. How can we reconcile the two? Well, it’s interest-
ing. Every once in awhile, for Rehnquist, for modern left opponents of ex-
pansive federal reach in RFRA, maybe from far right opponents of certain
federal policies, I sometimes think that, for instance, right wingers have this
idea—and I say right wingers in a nice way because I am myself one of
them, registered Republican and all that—but I sometimes think that the
opposition to Roe is based upon the same image as the opposition to the
First Bank of the United States in the following sense: it’s a national public
right that anti-Roe people associate with a minoritarian faction—you know,
radical feminists. Whether it’s true or not, this is the image I think they
have in their head. And this national private right delegates extraordinary
power on an unbelievably untrustworthy institution: the abortion clinic. One
that is captured and is not subject to voice or exit. Because the voice is
shoddy and poor, and the exit, well, it’s not adequately policed through
medical information. Is that accurate? I don’t know. But I think that’s the
image that opponents of Roe have. And I want you to see that it’s the same
image that I think opponents of Hobby Lobby have, just translate everything
we’re taught as I talk to you. Right? So, the national government is captured
by a bunch of Evangelicals who push through RFRA, nobody knows what
the hell it means, it’s completely vague but it’s a feel-good piece of legisla-
tion. Once it gets in there, they start enforcing all kinds of bizarre rights to
be exempt from generally-applicable laws that seem to a lot of people like
special identity pork. And therefore, Hobby Lobby gets a sudden entitle-
ment—that nobody else has—to be exempt from generally applicable rules.
Now some people nod to that. I want you to see that’s exactly the same kind
of story that the right-wingers say about Roe and that Madison is saying
about the First Bank of the United States. I’m not trying to judge any of
these stories yet; I just want you to have a picture of the second Madisonian
theory of minoritarian capture. Now the big question is—we end everything
here, at 5:20—was Madison a hopeless schizophrenic? Was he crazy? Be-
cause how do we reconcile these two theories? It’s a really difficult task.
I think you can, and this is what I would call a unified field theory of
federalism and individual rights. Here’s a checklist. Ask first who was act-
ing: a state legislature, or Congress? Dealing with a topic within their com-
petence? And by that I mean, was Congress creating private rights that were
beyond the state capacity to regulate? Or was Congress trying to fix a non-
deliberative state institution, some state institution that seemed to be acting
as the southern governments in 1868? Did the state legislature, or Congress,
15
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deliberate in a manner suggesting that their signature flaws were not acti-
vated? In other words, do we see Congress inviting a lot of people in in an
open and public way and having an open majoritarian debate rather than a
minoritarian debate? Or do you see them hustling through a law without
really considering the ramifications? And finally, ask whether the state leg-
islature or Congress exercised such competence to create a framework for
decision-making properly constrained by exit and voice. What kind of thing
did they finally create? Did Congress create a sensible way of balancing
religious liberty against other liberties? Did the states create a system
whereby, when they enacted the Comstock Law in Texas,53 they sensitively
balanced the interests of women and the other interests? Or did they seem to
enact a law that only took into account one interest? If the instrument that
they created seemed to have weak constraints of exit and voice, in either a
majoritarian or a minoritarian way, that might be a signal that one of the
other flaws was triggered.
Now, I’m not going to talk any more. Actually I haven’t kept track of
time because it’s been so enjoyable talking to you all. So I have no idea
how much time we have left. But I’m done now.
53. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 119 (1973).
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